Whether the actual-malice standard should be reconsidered for public-figure defamation cases

QUESTIONS PRESENTED New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) federalized a large swath of libel law holding that the | First Amendment mandates proof of actual malice in | any defamation action brought by a public official. In | Curtis publishing Co. V. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the Court imposed that same requirement on public figure defamation plaintiffs. The correctness of extending the “actual malice” standard to public figure defamation plaintiffs has been repeatedly questioned by members of this Court, culminating in Justice Thomas, call two terms ago for the Court to “reconsider the precedents that require courts to apply it”. McKee v. Cosby, Jr., 139 S Ct. 675, 676 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari); see also Kagan, A Libel Story: Sullivan | Then and Now (reviewing Anthony Lewis, Make No | Law: The Sullivan Case and First Amendment (1991(¢ 18 Law and Social Inquiry 197, 211 (1993) (the use of | the actual malice standard in this wide range of cases appears to have little connection with the story of | Sullivan. Viewed from that vantage point, current libel . law seems the result not of steady and sensible common ii Questions Presentedcontinued law reasoning but of a striking disregard of the doctrine’s underpinnings). 1. Is the petitioner entitled to plain and structural error relief for the court’s violation of implementing the Constitution successfully under the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments. 2. Does the Petitioner meet the three threshold requirements to be eligible for plainerror relief. 3. Should the Court reconsider the argument of Freedom of Press in cases not involving reporters, journalists, photographers, but rather citizens who distribute malicious, egregious statements on the internet, social media. 4. In his dissent, Justice Neil Gorsuch raised the question, “In the case of New York Times v. Sullivan, if ensuring an informed democratic debate is the goal, how well do we serve that interest with rules that encourage falsehoods in quantities no one could have -envisioned almost 60 years ago?” 5. Should this case be the Court’s return of its attention to the “safe deposit” of our liberties. Justice Gorsuch, dissenting from the denial of certiorari in SHKELZEN BERISHA v. GUY LAWSON, ET AL, statement | | iii Questions Presentedcontinued concerning New Sullivan, “But given the momentous changes in the Nation’s media York Times v. landscape since 1964, I cannot help but think the Court would profit from returning its attention, whether in this case or another, to a field so vital to the safe deposit” of our liberties. 6. Whether it is an abuse of discretion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures when a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk and/or court has failed to enter the party's default. 7. Whether it is an abuse of discretion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedures when the district judge—or a magistrate judge when authorized by local rule—fails to issue a iv Questions Presented-Continued mandated scheduling order as stated in Federal Rules of Civil Procedures Rule 16. 8. Whether the PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI should be fully granted when the Petitioner was given the opportunity to add Respondents after the judge’s Order to file an Amended Complaint. | | iv Questions Presented-continued 9. Should the Petitioner be allowed damages when the court denied a mandated Scheduling Order and Discovery process for the petitioner to prove calculated damages in the case. | Vv