Does the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine also apply to common law torts between noncompetitors, such as state law claims for abuse of process and wrongful use of civil proceedings?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. In Eastern RR Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) and in United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), the United States Supreme Court recognized that litigants are immune from antitrust liability under the Sherman Antitrust Act, unless the litigants are engaged in objectively baseless, “sham” litigation. Does the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine also apply to common law torts between noncompetitors, such as state law claims for abuse of process and wrongful use of civil proceedings? 2. In California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972), the Supreme Court found that pursuing of a “pattern of baseless, repetitive claims” may qualify as sham litigation, and is thus left unprotected under the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. Over a span of six years, the Respondents pursued multiple legal challenges against the Petitioner, which were all rejected at various stages. Is application of the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington Doctrine a legal question to be resolved on a motion to dismiss, or a fact issue for a jury to decide? 3. KRS 100.347 states that person or entity “claiming to be injured or aggrieved” by a zoning decision “shall appeal” that decision “to the Circuit Court of the County in which the property .. . lies.” Is a litigant “claiming to be injured or aggrieved” automatically shielded from claims of abuse of process or wrongful use of civil proceedings merely because he or she has standing to bring such a legal challenge?