Does Section 230 immunity extend to the removal of viewpoint-based speech on matters of public concern when the content of the speech is neither facially obscene, excessively violent, nor harassing?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 47 US.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) grants certain civil immunity to interactive computer service providers who, in good faith, remove “material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.” State and federal courts nationwide are split on whether a provider’s right to remove “otherwise objectionable” material confers expansive immunity to censor material that the provider claims is “objectionable” only because of the speaker’s subjective, political viewpoint—not for its facially obscene, immoral, violent, or harassing content. The questions presented in this case are: 1. Does Section 230 immunity extend to the removal of viewpoint-based speech on matters of public concern when the content of the speech is neither facially obscene, excessively violent, nor harassing? 2. Does Section 230 further preempt state claims for breach of contract, thereby allowing providers to breach with impunity their self-imposed undertakings to host particular content?