Whether the Sixth Circuit may disregard the Court's holding that Garmon preemption is jurisdictional, turning not on a claim's labels but, instead, on its substance, and allow a multiemployer fund to plead around Garmon preemption, avoid the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction, and invoke a federal court's jurisdiction simply by labeling its claim as an ERISA § 515 contract claim when evidence shows that, in substance, it is an unfair labor practice claim under Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA?

QUESTION PRESENTED Under San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959), the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction, and federal courts lack jurisdiction, over conduct that is “arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of’ the NLRA, including an employer's obligation to maintain the status quo under an expired collective bargaining agreement while it negotiates for a new one under Section 8(a)(5). For claims regarding contribution obligations to multiemployer benefit funds, if the obligation is statutory under Section 8(a)(5), the NLRB has jurisdiction; if it is contractual under a plan or collective bargaining agreement, a federal court has jurisdiction under ERISA § 515. Laborers Health & Welfare Tr. Fund for N. Cal. v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 549 (1988). Here, the Operating Engineers’ Local 324 Fringe Benefit Funds pleaded a contract claim under ERISA § 515 against Rieth-Riley for contributions that, as a matter of undisputed fact and governing law, are statutory status quo obligations under Section 8(a)(5). After determining the substance of the claim with evidence, the district court granted Rieth-Rileys motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to hear the Funds’ claim simply because they had labeled it as a § 515 claim. The Sixth Circuit’s decision warrants summary reversal. The question presented, therefore, is: Whether the Sixth Circuit may disregard the Court’s holding that Garmon preemption is ii jurisdictional, turning not on a claim’s labels but, instead, on its substance, and allow a multiemployer fund to plead around Garmon preemption, avoid the NLRP’s exclusive jurisdiction, and invoke a federal court’s jurisdiction simply by labeling its claim as an ERISA § 515 contract claim when evidence shows that, in substance, it is an unfair labor practice claim under Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA?