issues-being-raised

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The Questions Presented are: 1. The word “substantial” is not found in the governing statute, CPLR 5601(a), or the New York State Constitution provision that provides for appeals as of right on constitutional grounds. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 3(b)(1)-(2). There is a conflict in the circuits as to what the word “substantial” means, and whether dismissal of appeals as of right swa sponte deprives an aggrieved party of his or her due process rights under the N.Y. Const. Article I, § 11, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court of Appeals’ sua sponte dismissal of the complaint was an abuse of discretion and conflicts with this Court and other circuits and whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state supreme court from advocating in the interest of the state where the relevant time limitation to response in an action has expired and whether petitioner was provided adequate process. 2. Whether Section 298 of the New York State Division of Human Rights is unconstitutional and in violation of equal protection and due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution where the transfer of the proceeding is automatic by the lower court to the appellate division without any participation by the agency, who was a necessary named party in the lawsuit before the lower court, and under what circumstances ii QUESTIONS PRESENTED—Continued does non-participation equates to constitutional equal protection under the law and due process where a party did not timely appear, move to dismiss, and/or answer and whether the lower court and Appellate Division November 12 Order made based on a record that did not exist below and/or on appeal, and/or in the alternative, the November 12 Order made based on an incomplete record transcript and where the record was not settled as pursuant to CPLR § 5532 AND R. 1000.4(A)(2) [53-55]. See Weeden v. Ark, 2 A.D.3d 1280, 768 N.Y.S.2d 891 (4th Dept.2003); Matter of Lavar C., 185 A.D.2d 36, 592 N.Y.S.2d 535 (4th Dept.1992). 3. The Court of Appeals’ sua sponte dismissal conflicts with the Courts own guidance regarding “Rubber Stamping” an agency’s decision. Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 78 N.Y.2d 207, 216, 573 N.Y.S.2d 49, 54,577 N.E.2d 40, 45 (1991); Matter of Reape v. Adduci, 151 A.D.2d 290, 293, 542 N.Y.S.2d 562, 564 (1st Dept.1989). Did the Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department abuse and exceed its discretion in confirming the New York State Division of Human Rights final determination where the court lacked jurisdiction to do so thereby acting as an advocate for the agency and whether the New York State Division of Human Rights final determination was arbitrary, capricious, done in bad faith, error of law, and was not rationally based. iii QUESTIONS PRESENTED—Continued 4. Whether the actions of the New York State Division of Human Rights and Rochester City School District’s Stipulation of Discontinuance filed with the New York State Supreme Court and the Monroe County Clerk’s Office dated September 10, 2020 caused the lower court to lose its jurisdictional power to make an Order to transfer a matter to the Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department by Order dated October 27, 2020 where discontinued the action without serving the and under which state, federal and/ or constitutional amendment are the attorneys for the respondents allowed to stipulate to and discontinue an action with prejudice without the knowledge and consent of as her the prose litigant and under what circumstance would that be considered a deprivation due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and whether the matter should have been remanded to the Division for further proceedings. 5. Under what circumstances should an appellate court “rubber stamp” an agency determination by overlooking the abuse of discretion of the lower court which overstepped in its jurisdiction and was the school dis