Whether a court must automatically decline to vacate a judgment rendered by a judge with a financial interest in the party in whose favor he ruled, in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), solely because the court concurs with the conflicted judge's ruling on the merits

QUESTION PRESENTED In Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corporation, 486 U.S. 847 (1988), this Court set forth a three-factor test to determine whether it is appropriate to vacate a judicial decision because the judge who issued it should have recused himself under 8 U.S.C. § 455(a), which requires disqualification when the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Under that test, a court must evaluate whether vacatur is appropriate in light of: “[1] the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case, [2] the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and [3] the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process.” 486 U.S. at 864 (brackets added). This Court has not addressed the application of the Liljeberg factors to violations of § 455(a) since that decision. Over the last year, a widely-publicized investigation into federal judicial stockholdings has revealed hundreds of cases in which a judge had a financial interest in one of the parties. As one of the first cases addressing the fallout of this investigation, this petition raises the following question: Is it a proper application of the Liljeberg test for a court to automatically decline to vacate a judgment rendered by a judge with a financial interest in the party in whose favor he ruled, in violation of § 455(a), solely because the court concurs with the conflicted judge’s ruling on the merits?