Whether the First Step Act proceedings should be conducted similar to original sentencings in light of Concepcion v. United States

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW The First Step Act of 2018, §404, Pub. L. No. 115-391, §404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018) (“First Step Act”) was enacted to make sentence reductions available to eligible defendants based on reduced crack penalties originally granted to many defendants in 2010 through the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 132 Stat. 5194 (2010). As the lower courts implemented the First Step Act, they differed as to how they viewed the scope of First Step Act proceedings. Some courts viewed the proceedings as very limited in scope -differentiating them from initial sentencings -while others viewed the proceedings as more on par with original sentencings, matching both the obligations and discretion traditionally exercised in original sentencing proceedings. Petitioner sought modification of his crack sentence through the First Step Act. Although he was found to be eligible he was denied relief. Both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit operated through its precedent which held the more limited view of First Step Act proceedings. See e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 9 F.4th 1327 (11 Cir. 2021); United States v. Denson, 963 F.3d 1080, 1089 (11% Cir. 2020). Subsequently, this Court issued its opinion in Concepcion v. United States, __ S.Ct. _, 2022 WL 2295029 (June 27, 2022), in which it abrogated such precedent. Concepcion at *5, *7 n.2 (abrogating United States v. Denson, 963 F.3d 1080, 1089 1 (11% Cir. 2020)). Concepcion affirmed that First Step Act proceedings were not limited by the Constitution or by Congress, and thus, were to be conducted similar to original sentencings. Accordingly, the question presented for review is whether this case should be reversed and remanded in light of Concepcion? ii INTERESTED PARTIES There are no