Whether Mr. Vickers was required to prove 'actual reliance' by the sentencing judge on the ACCA's unconstitutional residual clause as a nonwaivable jurisdictional requirement

QUESTIONS PRESENTED After this Court struck down the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual cause in 2015, the Fifth Circuit granted Mr. Vickers permission to file a “second or successive” motion arguing that he was no longer eligible for an ACCA sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). The district court agreed that the sentence was unlawful in light of Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), and granted relief. The Fifth Circuit reversed that decision on the merits, then this Court overruled and vacated the Fifth Circuit merits decision. Rather than affirming the grant of relief, the Fifth Circuit ordered the district court to make additional findings to determine whether it even had jurisdiction to consider the authorized motion. 1. Was Mr. Vickers required to prove, in district court, that it is “more likely than not” that the sentencing judge “actually relied on” the ACCA’s unconstitutional residual clause when imposing the original sentence? 2. If Mr. Vickers was required to prove “actual reliance” by the sentencing judge, is that a nonwaivable jurisdictional requirement? Il DIRECTLY