Does the respondent have standing to assert claims as next friend of the child against the petitioner under Article III of the United States Constitution?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ; A Connecticut State law, in relevant part, provides: “Any family or household member ... who is the victim of domestic violence ... by another family or household member may make an application to the Superior Court for relief... The court, in its discretion, may make such orders as it deems appropriate for the protection of the applicant and such dependent children or other persons as the court sees fit. In making such orders ex parte, the court, in its discretion, may consider relevant court records if the records are available to the public from a clerk of the Superior Court ... Such orders may include temporary child custody or visitation rights, and such relief may include, but is not limited to, an order enjoining the respondent from (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the applicant; (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking the applicant; or (3) entering the family dwelling or the dwelling of the applicant ... If the applicant is under eighteen years of age, a parent, guardian or responsible adult who brings the application as next friend of the applicant may not speak on the applicant’s behalf at such hearing unless there is good cause shown as to why the applicant is unable to speak on his or her own behalf, except that nothing in this subsection shall preclude such parent, guardian or responsible adult from testifying as a witness at such hearing ... No order of the court shall exceed one year, except that an order may be extended by the court...” Conn. General Statute § 46b-15. : Thus, if a divorced parent alleges statutory aggrievement on behalf of the child _ against the other parent, in the absence of evidence, Connecticut law provides the first parent who claims to speak through the child to represent and plead on behalf of the Child against the other parent, regardless of what the parents’ divorce decree says, based on a standardless exercise of a judge’s discretion. All states have enacted similar restraining-order statutes. The questions presented are as follows: (1) Does the respondent have standing to assert claims as next friend of the child ' against the petitioner under Article III of the United States Constitution? (2) Does the federal law preempt a State’s restraining-order statutes under the Supremacy Clause? ; i , (8) Does a State violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due-process | . and equal-protection by applying the restraining-order statutes to order nocontact, except for commitment to a “facility for the diagnosis, observation or treatment of persons with psychiatric disabilities,” of the petitioner and her = child? . . (4) Does a state violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause to deny the enforcement . of the parties’ out-of-state divorce decree by applying the restraining-order : statutes? (5) Does a state impair the petitioner’s contractual rights under the Contracts Clause, without due process, by applying the restraining-order statutes to deny the enforcement of the custody and visitation terms : of : the settlement 4 : agreement incorporated, but not merged into, the divorce decree that spells out a the best interests of the child? . . ii