Daniel Naftalovich v. Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, et al.
DueProcess FirstAmendment CriminalProcedure
Question not identified
Questions Presented APrimary questions presented 1) Is California’s Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) a criminal statutory scheme where it results as a matter of law and in practice in relief that is criminal in nature under Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988) and where it essentially copied-and-pasted the Penal Code into the Family Code and created an alternate ‘arrest warrant’ process? 2) Do violations of the separation of powers occur where under the DVPA relief that is criminal in nature is granted by the Superior Court without any involvement whatsoever by the executive branch and where the judge is instructed to essentially prosecute a requesting party’s case for her by the Court of Appeal’s mandate to “play a far more active role in developing the facts” in a manner that the Court of Appeal has itself recognized is not a “purely adversarial setting”? Un re Marriage of Nadkarni, 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1500 (2009); Ross v. Figueroa, 139 Cal.App.4th 856, 867 (2006).) 3) Is the definition of “abuse” under the DVPA as any conduct that upsets the other party void for vagueness under this Court’s recent decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) due to the “grave nature” of the “serious consequences” wherein a person may be removed from his home and deprived of numerous other fundamental rights? 4) Is protection of people’s emotional calm within romantic relationships a ‘compelling’ reason to deprive a respondent’s fundamental rights in DVPA proceedings where even California’s own Court of Appeal has recognized that “[t]here is no occasion for the i t law to intervene in every case where some one’s feelings are hurt”? (California Family Codé §6320(c); Cochran v: Cochran, 65 Cal.App.4th 448, 496 (1998).) i Be 7 > B Additional questions presented ' : 5) Is a form checkbox prior restraint on speech unconstitutional as a matter of law where its application via the Judicial Council Form calls for no factually—based limitation by the judicial officer and where its broad scope covers all content of discussion? 6) Does cruel and unusual punishment or violation of due process occur when the State restricts a person’s parenting rights ex parte for three months prior to a custody hearing or in a hearing with a standard of proof of only ‘by a preponderance of the evidence’ in proceedings that the State’s Court of Appeal openly acknowledged as being biased? 7) Did the State of California effect a violation of my right to freely exercise my religion and/or a violation of my right to be married when it executed a de facto termination of my marriage by residentially, physically, and verbally restraining me from my wife prior to any court-ordered or religious dissolution of the marriage and prior even to any filing of a petition for marriage dissolution or for legal separation? . 8) Was I denied equal protection of the law when the California Court of Appeal blatantly ignored its own case law holding that “[t]he writ process, not the appeal process, is the way to get that review” in a case involving temporary child custody orders and when the Superior Court similarly blatantly ignored the statutory letter and spirit of the law and clearly favored the female requesting party by granting her defective requests yet denying all my requests even when the other party did not provide disputing testimony? (Lester v. Lennane, 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 565 (2000).) ' I contend there are so many questions presented because the California Domestic Violence Prevention Act was imbued with unrestrained government power and caused a catastrophic breakdown of our justice system. fi q ‘ Il.