Gregory Edwin Dunn v. County of Santa Cruz, California
AdministrativeLaw SocialSecurity DueProcess FourthAmendment
Whether indigence should be deemed a suspect or quasi-suspect class
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether indigence should be deemed a suspect or quasi-suspect class under the Equal Protection Guarantee of the 5‘® amendment and the Due Process Clause of the 14 amendment? 2. Whether the denial of exercising the 6 amendment right to selfrepresentation through deprivations of Access to the Courts in an effective manner should be a enumerated fundamental right and liberty. 2-1 Whether such deprivations violate 28 U.S.C. 1654? 3. Whether CAND GO-75, PLRA codifications to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 violates the 14th amendment Equal Protection and Due Process clauses, the 5 amendment Equal Protection Guarantee and Due Process clauses, 1** amendment Speech and Petition clauses, Privileges and Immunities clause, and the 6‘ and 9th amendment rights and privileges of Free Indigent Citizens vis-A-vis Indigent Prisoner-Citizens and Free Non-Indigent Citizens? ! 3-1 Whether the 5 amendment ought to have an Equal Privileges & Immunities Guarantee such as in the 14 amendment to i prevent the Federal government from abridging the Privileges and Immunities of U.S. Citizens? 4. Whether during COVID-19, CAND GO-75 violated 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), the 14th amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection clauses, the 5‘ amendment’s Equal Protection Guarantee and Due Process clauses of Free Indigent Litigants and Citizens in its deprivation of the fundamental Privilege of Access to the Courts vis-a-vis Pro Se Indigent Prisoners and Free Non-Indigent Litigants and Citizens? 4-1 Whether Local Rules and General Orders should fall within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act’s Abrogation Clause, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)? 4-2 Whether CAND Civ-LR 1-5(j) violates Due Process, the 1st amendment Free Speech and Petition clauses, and 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)? 5. Whether CAND GO-75, PLRA codifications to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the lack of Summary Judgment Notice for Free Indigent Litigants, and the lower courts’ rulings violated the 9th amendment by denying Petitioner's ability to effectively exercise his fundamental liberty to self-representation under the 6h amendment & Privileges and Immunities clause? 6. Whether Foman Factor 3 should be construed literally for Free Indigent Litigants and Citizens in deciding whether to grant leave to amend? ii 6-1. Whether in an IFP case dismissed for failure to state a claim, Foman Factor 3’s application can extend across in and of itself as an applicable Foman Factor in a separate, distinct IFP action case dismissed for frivolity? 7. Whether the lack of notice and opportunity to be heard after judgment on appeal deprives Pro Se Indigent Litigants and Citizens Access to the Courts and denies them their right to effective 7-1 Whether Orders to Show Cause (OSC), deprives access for Pro Se Indigent Litigants right to Access the Courts for actions certified by the district court as frivolous? 8. Whether the applicable standard on appeal determining whether indigent litigants should maintain their IFP status deprives access to the courts and violates equal protection and due process, the 1s* amendment’s petition clause, and Privileges and Immunities for Indigent Citizens and Litigants whose IFP actions were dismissed for failure to state a claim in the trial 7 court, then invariably dismissed as frivolous on appeal after the trial court certifies it as such? 9. Whether any of the lower courts’ rulings constitute summary reversal of judgment or affirmance?