Whether the panel imposed an unsupported standard of proof for waiver under Illinois law, depriving the petitioner of due process

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED 1. The “demanding standard” of proof the Panel imposed on petitioner to show waiver of a contract condition under Illinois law has no foundation in that State’s jurisprudence. The Panel’s version denies relief if just one fact is inconsistent with waiver while Illinois law provides relief even when some facts are inconsistent with waiver. Did the Panel’s unsupported standard unfairly deprive petitioner of his ability to show a triable fact issue whether respondent waived a contract condition and so skewed summary judgment as to deny him due process of law? 2. Does the Panel’s misreading of Illinois law in exercising its supplemental jurisdiction to impose upon petitioner a more onerous burden of proving waiver than Illinois law requires violate the federalism principles of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), causing a substantial variation in outcomes between State and federal litigation, influencing the choice of a forum for future litigants and depriving petitioner of property rights he otherwise enjoys in State court? 3. Did the court of appeals irredeemably mishandle the summary judgment record by refusing to view the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to petitioner, the nonmoving party, when assessing his claim that after engaging in protected activity, he was discharged because of his protected activity?