speedy-trial

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED 1) SIXTH AMENDMENT SPEEDY TRIAL: Did the Tenth Circuit fundamentally err in its application of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 513, 531-36 (1972); when it attributed delay to the defense for time it took to discover, litigate, and prove government "tactical delay" and a bad-faith, delay-linked "pattern of widespread and continuous miscondcut" that "fundamentally compromised" the case; and also when it failed adequately to account for delay-linked Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations that “undermine[d]" the possibility of a fair trial? More concisely: * Under Barker, does the time it takes the defense to prove government delay and prejudice, weigh against the defendant? * Can a court apply the substance of the rejected "demandwaiver" rule and weigh the third Barker factor (a defendant's assertion of the speedy trial right) against the defense, and thereby excuse bad-faith government delay and prejudice, if the assertion of the right is not made pre-emptively? * Under Barker, can undisputed trial perjudice caused directly by bad-faith, delay-linked government conduct be mitigated by a-court's generalized, non-specific periods of defense caused delay? 2) SPEEDY TRIAL ACT: Under 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) and United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 338-39 (1988): After a district court has ruled that a criminal trial will be unfair as a result of bad-faith, delay-linked government misconduct; can the “seriousness ‘of the offense" factor alone justify allowing the unfair trial? 3) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: Did the Tenth Circuit err when it expanded the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 3288, creating a new, second sixth-month grace. period to allow the government the ability to re-indict following a dismissal, appeal, and the dismissal becoming final; despite the text of the statute which limits this time-period to "60-days"? 4) ISSUE PRECLUSION: Did the Tenth Circuit err when it created a circuit split; rejecting the standard set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 13, by announcing that a fully and ° fairly litigated suppression order cannot constitute a final judgment of issues for preclusion purposes? More concisely: * Is a fully and fairly litigated suppression order a "final judgment" of issues, enforcable under the federal doctrine of issue preclusion? aK ii