Whether Petitioner's counsel's actions constituted a waiver or forfeiture of the argument that the government failed to prove Petitioner distributed the specific chemical compound propanamide

QUESTIONS PRESENTED. In 1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which provided for a mandatory life without parole sentence for drug offenders who distributed very large quantities of specific drugs. At the time, 21 U.S.C. 812 listed Fentanyl as a Schedule II controlled substance. The word Fentanyl does not appear in the 1986 enhancement statute found at 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), where some common drug names appear after their scientific names, such as phencyclidine (PCP) or lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). Only the scientific chemical compound for fentanyl appears, which is propanamide in subsection (vi), which also makes reference to analogues for propanamide. This suggests Congressional intent in enacting 21 U'S.C. 812 was to make not only the chemical compound for fentanyl] but all its analogues of varying potency fall under the broader term “Fentanyl.” Petitioner was charged with distribution of propanamide under the first clause of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), which listed the chemical compound, but the government never introduced any evidence he had ever been in possession of that specific compound. Instead, the government referred only to Petitioner distributing Fentanyl throughout the trial, which presumably could have been any of the fentanylrelated compounds of different potencies. Petitioner’s counsel did not base his motion for judgment of acquittal on the government’s failure to prove that Petitioner had ever been in possession of or distributed propanamide. Without consultation with his client, Petitioner’s counsel agreed to an instruction from the district court that read “Fentanyl (also referred to as piperidinyl] propanamide) is a controlled substance within the meaning of the law.” The evidence at trial strongly suggested Petitioner had not distributed the potent opiate propanamide at all. Did Petitioner’s counsel’s actions constitute a waiver of the argument that the Petitioner had not distributed the chemical compound propanamide, or were his actions a forfeiture of the issue that the government had not proven an essential element of the crime Petitioner was charged with? Does this Court’s decision in Harmelin v. Michigan automatically preclude consideration of a cruel and unusual punishment argument for a first time 25-year-old drug distribution offender?