Whether a court can take a defendant's race into account to determine whether the defendant's custody, and thus his subsequent un-Mirandized confession, is voluntary?

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW In United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), this Court addressed the issue of whether an individual’s “consent to accompany the agents was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied.” 446 U.S. at 557. Although the Court eventually held that the totality of the circumstances was sufficient to support a finding by the lower courts that the individual voluntarily consented to accompany the officers, the Court nevertheless outlined some of the relevant factors that weighed against such a finding. Specifically, citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047 (1973), this Court noted that the individual’s race and gender were relevant factors that a court could take into effect. Id. at 558. On appeal, Mr. Woodson, a young African-American male, argued that the Court needed to take his race into account to determine whether his custody, and thus his subsequent confession, was involuntary after more than a dozen armed police officers came into his home with weapons drawn and handcuffed Mr. Woodson for half an hour before interrogating him for an hour. The Eleventh Circuit held that the issue of voluntariness was close, but held that the officers’ one statement that Mr. Woodson was not under arrest was sufficient to make the detention voluntary. However, the Eleventh Circuit failed to take Mr. Woodson’s race into account in that analysis. This petition thus raises the following issue: Question Presented: Whether a court can take a defendant’s race into account to determine whether the defendant’s custody, and thus his subsequent un-Mirandized confession, is voluntary? i INTERESTED PARTIES There are no