Gregory K. Parsons v. Connie K. Copeland Parsons, et al.
SocialSecurity JusticiabilityDoctri
Whether a state court can override a VA decision denying an apportionment of a veteran's disability benefits
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. In Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 641-642; 107 S. Ct. 2029; 95 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1987), Justice Scalia stated in his concurring opinion: Iam not’ persuaded that if the Administrator [now the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (VA)] makes’ an apportionment ruling, a state court may enter a conflicting child support order. It would be extraordinary to hold that a federal officer’s authorized allocation of federally granted funds between two claimants can be overridden by a state official. KK Lalso disagree with the Court’s construction of 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) [now § 511 (amended)], which provides that “decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law administered by the Veterans’ Administration providing benefits for veterans and their dependents...shall be final and conclusive and no other official or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision.” The Court finds this inapplicable because it does not explicitly exclude statecourt jurisdiction, as it does federal...and because its underlying purpose of “achiev[ing] uniformity in the administration of veterans’ benefits and protect[ing] the Administrator from ii expensive and time-consuming litigation”...would not be impaired. I would find it inapplicable for a much simpler reason. Had the Administrator granted or denied an application to apportion benefits, state-court action providing a contrary disposition would arguably conflict with the language of § 211 making his decisions “final and conclusive” — and if so would in my view be pre-empted, regardless of the Court’s perception that it does not conflict with the “purposes” of § 211. But there is absolutely no need to pronounce upon that issue here. Because the Administrator can make an apportionment only upon receipt of a claim...and because no claim for apportionment of the benefits at issue here has ever been filed, the Administrator has made no “decision” to which finality and conclusiveness can attach. (emphasis added). So stated Justice Scalia, speaking to the applicability of 38 U.S.C. § 211 [now § 511 (amended)] to the very circumstances that is before the Court in this case. After Rose, supra, Congress changed the language in 38 U.S.C. § 511(a) to provide that the Secretary of the VA “shall decide all questions of law and fact necessary to a decision that affects the provision of benefits by the Secretary to veterans or the iii dependents or survivors of veterans” and further that the Secretary had exclusive jurisdiction over all such questions, and its decision “as to any such question shall be final and conclusive and may not be reviewed by any other official or by any court, whether by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.” (emphasis added). The reference in § 211(a) to courts “of the United States” was replaced with a separate sentence that excludes review of benefits determinations by “any other official or by any court.”). See 38 U.S.C. § 511(a) (emphasis added). Moreover, the first sentence was changed to make it clear that the Secretary “shall decide all questions of law and fact’ relative to claims made by dependents for a portion of the veterans’ restricted benefits, as opposed to the prior language, which merely provided that the “decisions of the Administrator” would be deemed final and conclusive. In passing the Veterans Judicial Review Act (VJRA), Congress also created a specialized Article I Court to oversee exclusive appellate review of the VA Secretary’s decisions on apportionment claims. These sweeping and fundamental changes in the law removed any doubt about the _ federal government’s primary and exclusive jurisdiction concerning all claims for veterans’ benefits. This case presents the very question Justice Scalia posed in Rose, with the added benefit of Congress’ subsequent, direct response in passing the VJRA and amendments to 38 U.S.C. § 511, namely: Where the VA denies a claim for an apportionment