When a criminal defendant must make a personal decision whether to waive a fundamental constitutional right, does an attorney provide deficient performance by waiving the right without first receiving the defendant's informed consent?

QUESTION PRESENTED Mr. Murray is a state prisoner litigating a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §2254. During the state proceedings, the parties waived Mr. Murray’s right to a jury trial on one of three charges. The parties did so without Mr. Murray’s informed consent. There’s no dispute in this appeal that the invalid jury trial waiver amounted to a Sixth Amendment violation. This jury trial waiver claim is procedurally defaulted. See generally Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 744-54 (1991). The only dispute in this appeal is whether Mr. Murray can show cause to excuse the procedural default. Mr. Murray can show cause because his trial attorney provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. The Constitution assigns certain critical decisions in a criminal case to a defendant personally, including whether to waive a jury trial, and an attorney may not make those decisions unilaterally on a client’s behalf. Here, Mr. Murray’s attorney provided deficient performance by agreeing to the waiver without first getting Mr. Murray’s informed consent. But the Ninth Circuit rejected this position. In its view, a defense attorney may reasonably choose to waive a client’s right to a jury trial—even without the client’s informed consent—so long as the attorney has a legitimate strategic basis for approving the waiver. In contrast, at least four circuit courts of appeals and four state appellate courts of last resort would find deficient performance here. The question presented is: When a criminal defendant must make a personal decision whether to waive a fundamental constitutional right, does an attorney provide deficient performance by waiving the right without first receiving the defendant’s informed consent? i