Whether the presumption of prejudice established in Mattox and Remmer continues to apply to cases involving juror exposure to extraneous information and outside influence when such exposure and influence is not discovered until postconviction proceedings, and what burdens and standards of proof apply in such situations?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Not until postconviction proceedings did it come to light that one of the jurors who convicted Sir Mario Owens had a vast array of personal connections to people, places, and events related to the case, including an out-of-court encounter and hug with a prosecution witness in a visit to her son’s home during trial, where her son advised her to get off the case because she was “too close” to it. The questions presented are: L Whether the presumption of prejudice established in Mattox and Remmer continues to apply to cases involving juror exposure to extraneous information and outside influence when such exposure and influence is not discovered until postconviction proceedings, and what burdens and standards of proof apply in such situations? I. Whether the federal doctrine of implied juror bias is the supreme law of the land and determined by an objective legal standard that does not depend on the juror’s own assessment of his or her impartiality?