Whether there is a fundamental difference between material exculpatory and impeachment evidence when a guilty plea is involved, and does due process require that a defendant be entitled to protections under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), when it comes to disclosing exculpatory evidence when it would impact a defendant's decision to plead guilty?

QUESTION PRESENTED In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), this Court held that due process requires the government to disclose material exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant. This Court decided in United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002), that “the Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.” It did not, however, extend that holding to material exculpatory evidence. The question presented is: Whether there is a fundamental difference between material exculpatory and impeachment evidence when a guilty plea is involved, and does due process require that a defendant be entitled to protections under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), when it comes to disclosing exculpatory evidence when it would impact a defendant’s decision to plead guilty? i