Whether and when a defendant's contemporaneous subjective understanding or beliefs about the lawfulness of its conduct are relevant to whether it 'knowingly' violated the False Claims Act

QUESTION PRESENTED This case presents a nearly identical question as No. 21-1326, United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc. and No. 22-111, United States ex rel. Proctor v. Safeway, Inc. In Schutte, at the invitation of this Court, the United States, through the Solicitor General, filed a Brief as Amicus Curiae and advocated that the petition for a writ of certiorari in that case should be granted. In that Amicus Brief, the United States explained that this case also “highlights the need for this Court’s review.” United States Schutte Amicus Br. 22. Accordingly, the Court may wish to consider this petition along with the petitions filed in Schutte and Proctor. Alternatively, Sheldon respectfully requests that the Court hold this petition pending the Court’s decisions in Schutte and Proctor and then dispose of this petition as appropriate. The FCA protects Government programs from fraud by, inter alia, imposing civil liability on anybody who knowingly presents false claims for payment to the Government. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). The statute defines “knowingly” to include acting with: (1) actual knowledge; (2) deliberate ignorance; or (3) reckless disregard of the falsity of information. See id. at § 3729(b)(1)(A). The question presented is: Whether and when a defendant’s contemporaneous subjective understanding or beliefs about the lawfulness of its conduct are relevant to whether it “knowingly” violated the False Claims Act.