Question not identified

Questions Presented 1. Under the Jackson standard and per Garrett v. U.S. 471 U.S. 779, 1791, is this conviction of Texas Penalty code §19.03 (a) (2) capital murder a “Void Conviction” because it is impossible to intentionally commit a (completed) murder “in the course of’ committing or attempting to commit the predicate felony if the death did not “ensue” until nearly 30 years later and there is no evidence to prove so? 2. Did the trial counsel’s failure at trial to subject any of the prosecution’s witnesses to cross examination or present any defensive evidence amounted to denial of counsel and “structural error” under U.S. v. Chronic and Bell v. Cone? 3. Did the state courts adjudicated and reviewed the case with a lack of impartiality based on a presumption of guilt standard which conflicted with the due process requirements of Jackson standard and constituted a “structural error”? 4. Did the prosecution of the case as a 30-year delayed death capital murder despite time bar violate the protections of statute of limitations, due process, and ex post facto rights enunciated in Stogner v. California and Rogers v. Tennessee? 5. Did the retrospective application of the novel construction of the capital murder charge with the novel definition of delayed death homicide in the case violate the fair warning and ex post facto principles of due process enunciated in Rogers v. Tennessee, and is the continued use of the novel definition of delayed death homicide with sequential causation plausible and reasonable? 6. In the context of Texas Penal Code §6.04 (a) and after the abrogation of the “year-and-aday” rule in Rogers v. Tennessee, what criteria would justify prosecution of a death after a remote injury as a delayed death homocide and prevent abusive use of such charge, as in this case and potentially against athletes in CTE (chronic traumatic encephalopathy) and other chronic encephalopathy cases? 7. As under Texas law, expired limitation is a complete defense equivalent to constructive amnesty, and extension of expired limitations is invalid under Stogner v. California, should Blockburg’s “sameness” test be applicable in determining if a time-barred case can be ; validly prosecuted under a different charge such as in this case? 8. Should common law doctrines of attenuation and laches have precluded the prosecution of this assaultive case decades later as a homocide, and was the retrospective judicial abridgment of those right a violation of the fair warning, and ex-post facto principles enunciated in Rogers v. Tennessee? 9. Did the state courts violate due process’s fair warning and ex post facto principles of Rogers v. Tennessee by retrospectively changing the rule of evidence for admission of Rule 404 (b) (2) evidence to allow the state to introduce the extransic testimonies of F.M. and K.A.B. against statutory and case law requirements? i , 10. Did the retrospective judicial abrogation of the common law doctrine of analytical construct violate fair warning and ex post facto principles of Rogers v. Tenseness, and should the reviewing court in the case have found acquittal based on insufficiency / no evidence, reasonable alternative hypotheses supported by evidence, and invalidity of charge? 11. Did the reviewing court err to not have found the state’s proof insufficient under the Jackson standard in lacking precision and certainty where there is no definitive actual or expert testimony on any of the essential elements of the 30 year delayed death capital murder charge and none of the reasonable hypotheses suggested by evidence was ruled out by evidence? 12. Did the prosecution violate due process by knowingly creating the false impression without competent testimony that K.B. was brutally attacked, severely strangle to sustain brain injury, and sexually assaulted in order to argue for the admission of F.M. and K.A.B.’s testimonies as false substitute evidence? 13. Did the prosecution violate due process by falsely and repeat