Whether an order granting relief and resentencing under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is final when the order changes the statutory sentencing range

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW On August 18, 2017 the district court granted Christopher Mitchell’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion seeking relief from his 15-year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (“ACCA”). It thereby ordered that de novo resentencing occur. The order replied upon then-controlling precedent, and the government did not appeal. More than three years later that resentencing had still not completed, and due to an intervening change in the law the government sought reinstatement of Mr. Mitchell’s original judgment. But, in the interim, Mr. Mitchell had received a 24-year sentence on related conduct in state court. He asked that rather than reimposing his original judgment, that the district court order his federal sentence be served concurrent with his related state sentence. But, the district court did not address his request for concurrent sentencing and instead entered an order vacating its prior vacatur order, and reinstating Mr. Mitchell’s original sentence. On appeal the Sixth Circuit held, inter alia, (1) that the district court had authority to vacate or modify its order vacating Mr. Mitchell’s original sentence, and (2) that when the controlling law changed while Mr. Mitchell’s resentencing was ongoing, the district court lacked authority to do anything but reinstate the original judgment. The questions presented here are: qd) Is an order granting relief and resentencing under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 final when the order changes the statutory sentencing range such that the district court cannot reimpose the original sentence, and such that any injury to the government is immediately apparent? (2) Alternatively, if such an order is not final, is the district court required to vacate it when the controlling law changes during the course of resentencing? ii