Whether plainly overbroad statutory language is sufficient to establish a prior state conviction is broader than the generic definition of a criminal sentencing enhancement provision?

QUESTION PRESENTED The categorical approach, as applied in the criminal context, requires comparison of the elements of a defendant’s prior conviction with the generic definition of a sentencing enhancement provision. Based upon this principle, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that unambiguously overbroad statutory language alone establishes a prior state conviction is broader than the generic definition. The Eighth and Fifth Circuits disagree. These circuits interpret Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007), to require defendants to point to a case-specific example where the state statute was applied in an overbroad manner, even if a statute is overbroad on its face. Last term, this Court rejected the government’s argument that a defendant must provide a case example to establish overbreadth in the face of a plainly overbroad federal statute in Taylor v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022). After Taylor, the Eighth Circuit has reaffirmed its prior position, finding Taylor is limited to the analysis of federal statutes. The question presented is: Whether plainly overbroad statutory language is sufficient to establish a prior state conviction is broader than the generic definition of a criminal sentencing enhancement provision? ii