Can reasonable jurists disagree whether a federal subpoena request for medical evidence, barred in state court because petitioner had not proven that independent review and testing of the medical evidence would prove its worth in challenging the prosecution's shaken baby theory of guilt, should be governed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Pinholster's bar on new evidence or by this Court's precedent permitting federal discovery where the habeas petitioner exercised reasonable diligence in state court?

QUESTION PRESENTED A father pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of his infant daughter based on a shaken baby autopsy report, all the while insisting he never hurt his child. In state post-conviction court, he tried to subpoena material to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel in failing to have an expert examine and further test medical evidence. The state court denied the subpoena because it concluded that Mr. Gramajo had not proven the testing, which had not been conducted by the defense, would have produced evidence helpful to establish ineffectiveness of counsel. In federal court, when he sought to subpoena the same material for the same purpose, the district court refused based on the Court’s restriction in Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011), on adducing new evidence in federal court. The question presented is: Can reasonable jurists disagree whether a federal subpoena request for medical evidence, barred in state court because petitioner had not proven that independent review and testing of the medical evidence would prove its worth in challenging the prosecution’s shaken baby theory of guilt, should be governed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Pinholster’s bar on new evidence or by this Court’s precedent permitting federal discovery where the habeas petitioner exercised reasonable diligence in state court?