Steven D'Agostino v. Bunce Atkinson
DueProcess
What is the significance and/or importance of the United States Trustee Office's Handbook for Chapter 7 Trustees?
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1) What is the significance and/or importance of the United States Trustee Office’s Handbook for Chapter 7 Trustees (hereinafter “the Handbook’)? A) Given the ample amount of recent authorities holding that several Chapter 7 . trustees had acted reasonably by following the Handbook, is the reverse also true? B) That is, if a Chapter 7 trustee chooses to completely flout / ignore the requirements that are set forth within the Handbook, does the trustee act unreasonably? (Or at a minimum, does the failure to follow the Handbook at least establish the prima facie prerequisite for a plaintiff to obtain Barton permission)? ' 2) In the performance of the statutory obligations set forth in JJ U.S. Code § 704(a), can a reasonably-acting Chapter 7 trustee fail to check the debtor’s schedules, AND also fail to detect the absence of required documents? A) For example, can a reasonably-acting Chapter 7 trustee fail to detect the absence of the detailed explanation of purported business expenses, as required by line 16 of the bankruptcy petition’s Schedule J? 8) Is circumstantial evidence alone sufficient to obtain Barton permission, when that circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that a conflict of interest (i.e. a professional and social relationship) had existed between the debtor and the Chapter 7 trustee? } 1“ Barton permission’ refers to a plaintiffs need to obtain permission from the Bankruptcy Court before being able to bring a private cause of action against a trustee, as initially established by this Court in Barton v. Barbour, 104 US 126 (1881). This requirement has recently been applied to Chapter 7 trustees. See Jn re VistaCare Grp, LLC 678 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir, 2012) (holding that the Barton doctrine extends to lawsuits against a bankruptcy trustee for acts done in the trustee's official capacity); Jn re J & S Props., LEC, 872 F.3d 138, 143 (3d Cir. 2017). 1