Whether the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals erroneously decided that the petitioner's predicate offense for his Sec. 924(c) is the conspiracy charge and not the substantive carjacking offenses

ISSUE PRESENTED I. Whether the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals erroneously decided that the petitioner's predicate offense for his Sec. 924© is the conspiracy charge and not the substantive carjacking offenses and in Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court invalidated the so-called residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), as unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563, 192 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2015). This Court has held, in the wake of Johnson, that the § 924(c)(3)'s residual clause remained valid. See United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 375-76 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1975, 201 L. Ed. 2d 247 (May 14, 2018), rehr'g denied, 138 S. Ct. 2646, 201 L. Ed. 2d 1045 (June 11, 2018). The Supreme Court, however, has now resolved the circuit split, holding that § 924(c)(3)'s residual clause, like that in the ACCA, is unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 204 L. Ed. 2d 757 (2019). Davis effectively invalidated Taylor, and it is now clear that a conviction for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery cannot be sustained as a predicate crime of violence for purposes of a conviction under the residual clause of § 924(c)(3)(B) as was done here. It also does not fall within the scope of the elements clause, § 924(c)(3)(A)?