Whether the Sixth and Fifth Amendments are violated by the imposition of restitution based on the sentencing judge's determination of a fact (other than a prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant?

QUESTION PRESENTED In Apprendi v. New Jersey, this Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S.466, 490 (2000). Four years later, Blakely v. Washington, clarified that Apprendi was not limited to cases where a sentence exceeded the maximum number of years of imprisonment permitted by Congress when the law was enacted, but rather that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004). Then in Southern Union Co. v. United States, this Court extended Apprendi beyond sentences of imprisonment to also apply to monetary penalties holding “that the rule of Apprendi applies to the imposition of criminal fines.” 567 U.S. 348, 360 (2012). However, the circuit courts have all declined to apply the rule of Apprendi (and Southern Union) to criminal restitution. In Mr. Reyes’ case, the Eleventh Circuit has held that Apprendi is inapplicable to restitution because the restitution statute does not have a monetary limit. United States v. Reyes, 2022 WL 4476660 (11th Cir. 2022). The question presented is: Whether the Sixth and Fifth Amendments are violated by the imposition of restitution based on the sentencing judge's determination of a fact (other than a prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant? i