Whether the subsequent in-court identification violated the defendant's due process rights given the district court's failure to conduct its gatekeeping duty

Question Presented for Review L Due process prohibits any “suggestive and unnecessary identification procedure” that does not possess “sufficient aspects of reliability.” Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106 (1977). In particular, the “practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, has been widely condemned.” Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982). Days before Petitioner Eric Romero-Lobato’s federal robbery trial, the government’s key eyewitness identified another man as the perpetrator to the lead detective and prosecutor. The district court declined to assess the reliability of the witness’s expected first time in-court identification of Romero-Lobato, dismissing the issue as one of weight. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit failed to address the district court’s abdication of its gatekeeping role and instead affirmed by making its own factual finding that the identification was sufficiently reliable. The question presented is whether the subsequent in-court identification violated Romero-Lobato’s due process rights given the district court’s failure to conduct its gatekeeping duty. ii