When the underlying state statute is plainly broader than the generic definition of a criminal sentencing enhancement provision, must the defendant also meet the actual case requirement?

QUESTION PRESENTED This Court’s longstanding categorical approach precedent requires comparison of the elements of a defendant’s prior conviction with the generic definition of a sentencing enhancement provision. Following this principle, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that plainly overbroad statutory language alone establishes a prior state conviction is overbroad. The Fifth and Eights Circuits, however, interpret Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007), to require defendants to point to an actual case where the state statute was applied in an overbroad manner, even when the statute is facially overbroad. Last term, this Court rejected the government’s argument that a defendant must provide an actual case to establish overbreadth of a plainly overbroad federal statute in Taylor v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022). Even after Taylor, the Fifth and the Eighth Circuits have refused to budge, continuing to require an actual case example in all circumstances. The question presented is: When the underlying state statute is plainly broader than the generic definition of a criminal sentencing enhancement provision, must the defendant also meet the actual case requirement? i