Whether the Ninth Circuit's decision is consistent with this Court's precedents on the Fourth Amendment's probable cause standard when suspicion is based on the possession of a large quantity of legal ammunition protected by the Second Amendment

QUESTION PRESENTED Probable cause for a warrantless arrest requires a “probability or substantial chance” of criminal activity. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018). When suspicion is based on acts or materials that are not per se illegal, “the relevant inquiry is ... the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts” or, more precisely, what “reasonable inference[s]” can be drawn. Id. at 586, 588 (citations omitted). When suspicion is based on “materials presumptively protected by the [Bill of Rights],” the same probable cause standard applies. New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 875 (1986). There, however, the Fourth Amendment requires examination of “what is ‘unreasonable’ in the light of the values” in other Bill of Rights amendments. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501, 504 (1973). Ammunition is legal to own in any quantity in Arizona and is presumptively protected by the Second Amendment; “without bullets, the right to bear arms would be meaningless.” Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 967 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated on other grounds by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142. 8. Ct. 2111, 2127 (2022). The dispositive concurrence in the Ninth Circuit’s per curiam majority opinion concluded, over a dissent, that the transportation of twenty 1,000-round boxes of legal ammunition for handguns and high-powered rifles, in a car with two illegally tinted windows, alone justified an arrest. Is the Ninth Circuit’s decision consistent with this Court’s precedents? i