When a defendant shows on Section 2255 collateral review that a prior conviction is no longer a valid predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), may a district court deny resentencing on the basis of an alternative prior conviction that was not specifically identified by the government as an ACCA predicate at the original sentencing?

QUESTION PRESENTED It is well settled that a criminal defendant’s right to due process extends to sentencing proceedings (Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 896 (2017)), where the government bears the burdens of proof and persuasion (Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 452 (1962)). At the heart of the due process right is entitlement to notice and an opportunity to be heard. This fundamental right has particular importance in the context of mandatory sentencing enhancements. Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713714 (2008); Oyler, 368 U.S. at 452. In contrast, a criminal defendant collaterally challenging a previously-imposed sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 bears the burdens of proof and persuasion, including of demonstrating that any error in the sentencing process was prejudicial. Against this background, the lower courts are intractably divided on the following question: When a defendant shows on Section 2255 collateral review that a prior conviction is no longer a valid predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), may a district court deny resentencing on the basis of an alternative prior conviction that was not specifically identified by the government as an ACCA predicate at the original sentencing (as allowed by the Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits), or must the court instead order resentencing to give the defendant an opportunity to challenge the alternative prior conviction’s qualification as an ACCA predicate in a context where the government bears the burden (as held by the First and Fourth Circuits)? ii STATEMENT OF