Does the standard for assessing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, announced in Strickland v. Washington, fail to protect the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process when a trial court finds grounds of unconstitutional performance of counsel, but that same court can deny relief following a 'no prejudice' analysis that relies on a trial record shaped by trial counsel's ineffective representation and the consequences of said representation?

QUESTION PRESENTED Kimberlee Szewczyk was on probation for unrelated charges when she was arrested on drug charges, ultimately resulting in her conviction at issue. She was only arrested because of evidence found as a result of an illegal search of her residence, which then led to her making incriminating statements to law enforcement. Both the evidence found and her statement was used against her at trial and was the State’s strongest argument. After arguing that her counsel violated her Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by failing to file a motion to suppress said evidence, and the state court agreeing that counsel was deficient, Ms. Szewczyk raises the following questions for this Court: Does the standard for assessing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, announced in Strickland v. Washington, fail to protect the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process when a trial court finds grounds of unconstitutional performance of counsel, but that same court can deny relief following a “no prejudice” analysis that relies on a trial record shaped by trial counsel’s ineffective representation and the consequences of said representation? i