Was the Fourth Circuit's finding of no materiality of the suppressed evidence inconsistent with this Court's clearly established precedents?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Marion Bowman’s convictions and death sentence rest on the compromised testimony of three witnesses who identified Bowman as the murderer. Two—James Taiwan Gadson and Travis Felder—had significant credibility issues, as they were charged as co-defendants and testified in exchange for lenient plea agreements with which they were impeached at trial. The State, however, suppressed evidence that Gadson himself confessed to committing the murder and suffered from memory and substance abuse problems. The third key witness, Hiram Johnson, had no agreement with the State, which made his testimony the centerpiece of its case for conviction and death. While suppressing evidence that Johnson had multiple unrelated felony charges that were brought by the same prosecutor and pending at the time of his testimony, the State characterized Johnson as a friend of Bowman’s with no incentive to lie, who thus lent credibility to its impeached witnesses. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly recognized this suppressed evidence may have benefited Bowman but, ultimately, found none of the or to his conviction or sentencing. In doing so, the Court of Appeals ignored this Court’s clearly established standards for materiality under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny, requiring summary reversal. The questions presented are: 1. Was the Fourth Circuit’s finding of no materiality of the suppressed evidence that identified another person as the perpetrator and ii impeached two primary witnesses—one of whom was that alternative perpetrator—on the issue of guilt or innocence inconsistent with this Court’s clearly established precedents? 2. Was the Fourth Circuit’s finding of no materiality with respect to the capital sentencing based solely on a finding that there was sufficient evidence to prove guilt contrary to this Court’s clearly established precedents?