Where a defendant's lawyer owed conflicting duties to her and a former client, should she receive a new trial if the actual conflict adversely affected the lawyer's performance, or must the defendant prove it reasonably likely that unconflicted counsel would have obtained a better outcome at trial?

QUESTION PRESENTED Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002) left unanswered what prejudice standard governs when a criminal defense lawyer has a successive conflict—one where the current client’s interests conflict with those of a former client. North Carolina and Nebraska presume prejudice where an actual successive conflict adversely affected the lawyer’s performance, per Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). Kentucky, Idaho, and now West Virginia only reverse if an actual conflict that adversely affected performance also affected the trial’s outcome, per Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The federal courts also split in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 cases. The question presented is: Where a defendant’s lawyer owed conflicting duties to her and a former client, should she receive a new trial if the actual conflict adversely affected the lawyer’s performance, or must the defendant prove it reasonably likely that unconflicted counsel would have obtained a better outcome at trial? i