In determining whether to presume prejudice under Rideau and Skilling, are courts permitted to consider (1) the defendant's role in creating the pretrial publicity and (2) the voir dire transcript?

Question Presented for Review When pervasive pretrial publicity threatens a defendant’s right to a fair trial, the Sixth Amendment requires the trial judge to grant a change of venue. And in extreme cases of extensive and inflammatory media coverage, evidence of jurors’ actual prejudice is not necessary; rather, a presumption of prejudice requires a change of venue. This Court in Rideau v. Louisiana, and more recently in Shilling v. United States, outlined the appropriate analysis for determining whether pretrial publicity warrants a presumption of prejudice, particularly when a defendant’s confession is publicized to the community that houses the jury pool. That analysis should have triggered a presumption of prejudice here. After killing his two young children and ex-mother-in-law, James Mammone, III’s name and face were plastered across local television screens, newspapers, radios, and other media outlets. The small Canton community was saturated with inflammatory news stories involving the details of the crime, and later, Mr. Mammone’s handwritten confession to those murders. This publicity evoked a strong emotional response within the community. Countless comments regarding Mr. Mammone’s case were published online, detailing individuals’ feelings that Mr. Mammone was guilty and deserving of the death penalty—all before a single piece of evidence was presented at his trial. The trial court denied Mr. Mammone’s motion for a change of venue because the court first wanted to attempt to seat a jury. The case then proceeded to trial in the original venue, and Mr. Mammone was found guilty and sentenced to death. Mr. Mammone appealed, arguing that the trial court should have presumed prejudice given the extensive and inflammatory news coverage in his case. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected that claim, as did the district court and Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in adjudicating his subsequent habeas petition. In doing so, the courts considered (1) Mr. Mammone’s role in creating the pre-trial publicity and (2) the voir dire transcript—both considerations that run contrary to this Court’s precedent in Shilling and Rideau. And even where the courts considered the correct factors, they did so using bright-line rules that similarly contravene Supreme Court precedent: they declined to presume prejudice because the confession was conveyed through print rather than televised, and on the fact that four months had passed since the confession was first published. Mr. Mammone thus now raises the following questions for this Court’s review: In determining whether to presume prejudice under Rideau and Skilling, are courts permitted to consider (1) the defendant’s role in creating the pretrial publicity and (2) the voir dire transcript? In determining whether to presume prejudice under Rideau and Skilling, are courts permitted to apply bright-line rules relating to (1) the fact that a confession was conveyed via print rather than televised, and (2) the number of months elapsed since the news coverage first began? ii