Whether the Constitution permits a sentencing judge to find non-elemental facts by a preponderance of the evidence and then rely on those facts to impose a sentence in excess of the one established by Congress

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1) Whether the Constitution permits a sentencing judge to find non-elemental facts by a preponderance of the evidence and then rely on those facts to impose a sentence in excess of the one established by Congress for the offense of conviction, which is exactly what happened here where Barrera plead guilty, without a plea agreement, to the only offense charged in the indictment, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)—an offense without a mandatory minimum—but was nevertheless sentenced to the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) based solely on the judge’s findings regarding non-elemental facts made over Barrera’s substantive and procedural objections. 2) Whether, when determining if a state offense qualifies as a violent felony, a federal court is bound by the decision of the state’s highest court to label a mens rea as something greater than reckless when this Court has unequivocally established that the same mens rea under federal law constitutes mere negligence. i