whether the District Court Approach to 2254 petition asserting a loss of a fundamental constitutional right to choose whether to testify in his own defense

No question identified. : Che I. Question’s presented 1. whether the District Court Approach to 2254 petition asserting a loss of a fundamental constitutional right to choose whether to testify in his own defense. The district court’s deviation from legal mode of procedure, : resulting in refusal to conduct Federal evidentiary hearing post to level of illegitimate and unconstitutional practices. See Rock v. Arkansas 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987), United States v. Teague, 943 F.2d 1525 (11" Cir. 1992) (En Banc) 2. whether District court abused of Discretion constitute extra judicial proceeding when he (judge) refused to contemplate “where justice requires” before dismissing 2254 petition requesting leave to amend. District court judge failed to employ the courts limited discretion granted by 2254 (b), nor is equitable discretion grounded in the miscarriage of the justice exception. See. Necron V.City of mini Beach. 13 F.3d 1563) 1590 ites 1997) See Slattery Company Inc. v. United States 231 F.2d 37 (1956 U.S. App. Bauvast V Dupece 25a F. i we et 2001 } Q3u F.2d WH Lexis 3365 No. 15741). Advanced Futility Aagumewt, . See. Unwle volgen, you. 371, 280945) Tide v Boho, 281 Fina 43,995 C5 eu 16) 3. Whether District judge refusal to follow an applicable rule of law expressly articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States amounts to judicial usurpation of power. See Espey v. Wainwright 734 F.2d 748, 750 (11" Cir. 1984) 4. Whether the 11 Circuit made a contrary ruling concerning the lossof a fundamental constitutional right to testify here by denying petitioner relief | where the facts of the case are clearly evident on the face of the court record and included in a remand order from the 11% Circuit, who’s statement was that the parties agree the trial court jude made a legal statement of the law that misinformed the petitioner. The 11 Circuit wanted to know what the petitioner was thinking after this information was given by the trial judge. On limited remand petitioner iNowesty testified under oath as to what he was thinking at that time, and what he had been told by trial counsel concerning use of prior conviction if he choose to testify. The colloquy initiated by trial judge is identical as to what occurred in cases decided by the 11th Circuit and the facts clearly show petitioner’s case deals with the same set of facts layed out in several prior cases dealing with the loss of a fundamental right to testify that the 11" Circuit has granted relief. Here the . District court and the 11" Circuit failed the petitioner according to the facts : of this case. After the petitioner testified at a limited hearing afforded by the 11" Circuit, the District court judge who has previously shown bias toward the petitioner was allowed to hold a hearing on fact finding as to whether the petitioner was credible, deny the petitioner; of which the 11" Circuit upheld this bias judge ruling A cases such as this. Petitioner’s argument} . 4 ; @ a concerning the use of prior felony convictions involving dishonesty for impeachment, which improperly caused Thomas to deny his only defense by waiving his right to testify? Petitioner’s case revolves around ttrial counsels failure to correctly advise petitioner on the use of prior convictions. This misadvive before and during Petitioner’s trial lead Petitioner to make an unknowing and involuntaty waiver of a fundamental constitutional right to testify at trial. Not only did trial counsel mislead Petitioner, the trial judge also misadvised the Petitioner during a colloquy which the trial judge initiated with Petitioner. Trial judge told Petitioner if he so choose to testify he would have to say yes to ten (10) crimes of dishonesty and that the state on cross would come back and open up Petitioners prior . convictions to the jury. This caused Petitioner to think not only that he was doomed if he chose to take the stand and testify in his own behalf, but that the jury would be told about petitioner’s prior convic