Whether Section 2254(d)(1) prohibits lower federal courts from considering precedent from courts other than the Supreme Court in determining whether a state court's application of clearly established Federal law was unreasonable

QUESTION PRESENTED Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a state prisoner petitioning for federal habeas relief ordinarily must demonstrate either that the state court unreasonably determined facts in light of the evidence, or, as relevant here, that the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by [this Court]”. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1), (d)(2). Here, relying on this Court’s decision in Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37 (2012), and in conflict with the Second Circuit and at least in tension with several other circuits, the Sixth Circuit concluded that it could not consider its own prior precedent in determining whether a state court decision constitutes an “unreasonable application” of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and its progeny. OK OK The question presented is whether Section 2254(d)(1) prohibits lower federal courts from considering precedent from courts other than this Court in determining whether a state court’s application of clearly established Federal law was unreasonable.