Whether lower federal courts may transpose a prima facie §1983 claim into a constitutional challenge not presented by the plaintiff's complaint

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED ; I. Article Ill of the Constitution of the United States of America limits federal courts to hearing the actual case or controversy before them. May lower federal courts and federal courts of appeal transpose a prima facie claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 into a Constitutional challenge which was not presented by the Petitioner's well-pleaded complaint and forego any analysis required under §1983 thus altering the case before it and yielding an outcome that is not responsive to the actual claims presented in Plaintiff's complaint and is tantamount to an advisory opinion? ll. A prima facie claim under §1983 consists of two elements: (1) Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants(s) acted under color of state law; and (2) While acting under color of state law, Defendant(s) deprived Plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right.1 May lower federal courts and federal courts of appeal dispose of a prima facie claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 by refusing to consider whether the defendants acted under color of state law where state law is established and where no valid abstention doctrine applies? Il. Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”2 May lower federal courts and federal courts of appeal deny a motion for summary judgment under a §1983 claim where the material facts of the case are not in dispute; where the defendants, by their own admission, have acted under color of state law; where the defendants have admitted in their filings to the court that they “do not 1 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); See also Johnson v. Karnes, 398, 873 (6th Cir. 2005). ii dispute that...Plaintiff has a protected property interest in her classified employment;”$ and where there is no theory by which the defendants may prevail under established state law? IV. “When deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a district court should address four factors: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the irreparable harm that could result if the injunction is not issued; (3) the impact on the public interest; and (4) the possibility of substantial harm to others.” Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 973 F.2d 507, 511 (6th Cir.1992) (internal citation omitted). “These factors are not prerequisites, but are factors that are to be balanced against each other.” Overstreet v. LexingtonFayette Urban County Gov't, 305 F.3d 566, 573. May lower federal courts deny a motion for injunctive relief based on its assessment of one of the four factors required without considering the other three factors and without balancing the four factors against each other? | V. The issuance of an injunction is appropriate where there is relief that a court may offer. May circuit courts render an interlocutory appeal of the denial of injunctive relief moot in a case where a state employee seeks an injunction against her employer and the employer terminates her, yet the appellate court may order her reinstated upon a finding that injunctive relief should have been granted below? Would the fact that this sort of behavior is capable of reputation yet evading review impact this determination? 3 See page 13 of Defendants Response to Plaintiffs motion for injunctive relief. iti