Does the Speedy Trial Act require the accused to object to lack of speedy trial only after the time has lapsed, or can the accused assert this right prior?

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. The Speedy Trial Act clock was set to expire in this case on February 18, 2021. The day before, the parties appeared at a status conference during which the district court announced that the motion of the Government to extend the trial would be granted and that because of General Orders related to COVID, the earliest trial could commence would be April 12, 2021. Nevarez objected to this. His trial occurred on April 12, 2021, after the speedy trial clock had expired. The Tenth Circuit did not reach the merits of the speedy trial claim, concluding that the objection by Nevarez was made one day too late, i.e., the clock had not actually expired when he objected thus he had waived the issue. The question presented is: Does the Speedy Trial Act require the accused to object to lack of speedy trial only after the time has lapsed, or can the accused assert this right prior? i