whether-redetermination-is-warranted

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether redetermination is warranted of a) my claims in Komatsu v. NTT Data, Inc., No. 15-7007 (LGS)(S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2016) (hereinafter referred to as “K2”), b) the refusal by U.S. District Judge Lorna Schofield to recuse herself from K2, c) her decisions and orders in K2 since 5/17/16, and d) decisions and orders in Komatsu v. NTT Data, Inc., cv-030955-12/NY (Civ. Ct., NY Cty.) (hereinafter referred to as “K1”) since 4/11/14 pursuant to findings in Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 99 S. Ct. 970, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1979) that are about an exception to res judicata because reason exists to doubt the fairness, quality, and extensiveness of procedures followed in K2 and K1 by Judge Schofield and others that partly include the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (hereinafter referred to as the “Second Circuit”). 2. Whether hindsight about the following material matters sufficiently establish that a) both the filing restriction that Judge Schofield imposed against me through her 6/28/22 memo endorsement in K2 and b) her refusal to grant me reconsideration about matters in K2 through that order were an abuse of discretion that warrants immediate reversal of that memo endorsement partly pursuant to FRCP Rule 60: a. The order that was issued on 12/9/22 in K1 terminated the stay of proceedings in K1 after that was imposed on 4/11/14 in response to the order that was issued then in K1 that also granted a motion to compel arbitration. b. The 4/11/14 order in K1] together with the fact that a) it was never financially possible for me to arbitrate claims of mine against NTT Data, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as “NTT”) and b) I was denied a fee waiver from the American Arbitration Association (hereinafter referred to as the “AAA”) that could have otherwise possibly enabled me to engage in that arbitration effectively and prejudicially strangled my ability to litigate claims against NTT until a court would possibly make a determination that an arbitration between NTT and I about my claims in K1 had been had by virtue of the fact that it was impossible for me to engage in that arbitration. c. The order that was issued on 12/9/22 in K1 that terminated the stay of proceedings in K1 complies with 9 U.S.C. §3 and was issued at my request and in accordance with the fact that Billie v. Coverall North America, Civil Case No. 3: 19-cv-00092 (JCH) (D. Conn. Mar. 16, 2022) confirms that when a plaintiff is unable to pay arbitration costs and that circumstance blocks him from being able to engage in arbitration, an arbitration has nonetheless been had between him and a legal adversary. d. The fact that NTT and Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC (hereinafter referred to as “Credit Suisse”) defaulted on engaging in arbitration against me by having never commenced an arbitration proceeding against me that would have been ; assigned to the AAA entitled me pursuant to 9 U.S.C. §4 to seek redress about ; that in K2 for an order that would reinstate K2, consolidate K1 with K2 due to the applicability of the exceptions to the Younger Abstention doctrine in K1, and cause K2 to proceed to trial while: i i. Compelling NTT and Credit Suisse to fully comply with the 1/16/13 subpoena that I was granted in K1 and the 4/12/13 discovery order that was issued in K1. ii. Granting me sanctions against NTT and Credit Suisse about the fact that they chose to defy that subpoena and the 4/12/13 discovery order in K1. iii. | Granting me sanctions about the fact that Francis Convery of NTT committed perjury in his 9/23/15 affidavit that was filed in NTT2. iv. Granting me sanctions against an attorney for NIT named Lisa Griffith about the fact that she committed fraud on the court and deceit against me by lying as recently as 3/1/22 in Komatsu v. NIT Data, Inc., No. 101264/2021 (Sup. Ct. NY Cty.) (hereinafter referred to as “K5”) by fraudulently claiming that NIT had complied with the 4/12/13 discovery order in K1. v. Granting me immediate