Whether the reasoning of United States v. Taylor applies to determining if an overbroad state crime qualifies as an Armed Career Criminal Act predicate

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on defendants with three or more “violent felony” convictions. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). To determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate, courts apply the categorical approach, determining whether the elements of the statute of conviction “match” the elements of the federal predicate offense. Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 503-05 (2016). If the elements are broader, there is no match and the prior conviction does not qualify as an ACCA predicate. See id. at 509. In Gonzalez v. Duenas Alvarez, the Court held that when a state crime’s elements appear to match the elements of the federal generic crime, a defendant must show a “realistic probability ... that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition” by pointing to “other cases in which the state courts in fact did apply the statute in the special (nongeneric) manner for which he argues.” 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007). However, last year in United States v. Taylor, when deciding whether a federal crime qualified as an ACCA predicate, this Court made clear that when the statute of conviction’s elements are broader than the elements of the federal predicate, “that ends the inquiry’—a defendant does not need satisfy the realistic probability inquiry set forth in Duenas-Alvarez. United States v. Taylor 142 S. Ct. 2015, 2025 (2022). The questions presented are: i L Is the reasoning of Taylor irrelevant to deciding whether an overbroad state crime qualifies as an ACCA predicate, as the Sixth Circuit held below? I. Did Duenas-Alvarez announce a blanket rule that a defendant must satisfy the realistic probability inquiry even when a state crime is plainly broader than the federal generic crime, as the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have held, or is the realistic probability inquiry obviated when the state crime is plainly broader than the federal generic offense, as the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held?