Whether the trial court was legally convened and constituted with the provisions of the constitution and statute to remain a 'Court of Competent Jurisdiction' after Petitioner was abandoned by his retained trial counsel at the most critical stage of his jury trial?

question presented is: (a) Whether the trial court violated Petitioner's Constitutional Sixth Amendment right when the trial judge permitted the departure of, [or] removed Petitioner's retained trial counsel-ofchoice at midtrial? And, (b) Whether the trial court violated Petitioner's Constitutio-~ nal Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a Fair-Trial and Due Process of Law by proceeding with the criminal prosecution after Petitioner was abandoned by his retained trial counsel, and was without the assistance of authorized counsel? ii QUESTION NUMBER THREE In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Black, stated: "In my view, it is a wholly fallacious idea that a judge's sense of what is fundamentally "Fair" or "Unfair" should ever serve as a substitute for the explicit, written provisions of our BILL OF RIGHTS. One of these provisions is the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against putting a man twice in jeopardy. On several occassions I have stated my view that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a State or the Federal Government or the two together from subjecting a defendant to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for the same offense." ASHE v. SWENSON, 397 US 436, at Pg. 447. To that extent, the question presented is: Whether the trial court violated Petitioner's 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendment Constitutional rights to have his trial completed by the particular jury first selected, when the trial judge without reviewing an alternative course of action, without manifest necessity or even declaring a mistrial, dismissed the deadlocked -jury after jeopardy had attached (expending less than an hour deliberating) and put Petitioner twice to jeopardy by imposing and sentencing him under the same indictment to an [unauthorized] probation, while Petitioner was without the assistance of his retained trial counsel? iii QUESTION NUMBER FOUR When a judge has served as an adjudicator for the State in the very same case the court is now asking to advocate, a very serious : question arises. : , This Honorable Court has repeatedly held that, "An unconstitutional potential for bias exists when the same person serves as both, accuser and adjudicator in a case. This objective risk of bias is reflected on the Due Process Maxim that 'no man can be / judge in his own case' and 'no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome." WILLIAMS v. PENSILVANIA, 579 . US 1, at HN3. In reference to the above, the question presented is: (a) Whether the Habeas Court violated Petitioner's Due Process and Equal Protection under the Law Constitutional Rights, when the Habeas Court disregarded the Actual Bias and Conflict of Interest, (reflected on the face of the record) and allowed current District Attorney Sharen Wilson, (former trial judge) to make and filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Habeas Proceed. ings, and represent the State as the Chief Defense Attorney; in . the very same case where she also presided as the trial judge? . | . . : (b) Whether the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made, drafted, and filed by Sharen Wilson's office are void from inception? . . . iv