Does a Federal Court's denial of a State prisoner's right to statutory tolling under 2244(d)(2) or 2244(da)(1)(B) effectively suspend the great writ in violation of Article I, section 9 of the United States Constitution?

Questions presented 1) Does a Federal Court's'denial of a State prisoner's right to statutory tolling under 2244(d)(2) or 2244(da)(1)(B) effectives ly suspend the great writ in violation of Article I, section 9 of the United States Constitution? ; 2) Did the District Court abuse its discretion by not considering the tolling effect if any of pending applications in State Court? 3) Is the petitioner's "Motion to Reconsider" filed within the AEDPA's (1) year grace period, a properly filed motion that tolls a State prisoner's limitation period under 2244(d)(2)? 4) Did the State Court's failure to enter an appealable order on petitioner's habeas petition constitute an impediment, under 2244(d)(1)(B)? 1 5) Does the State Court's denial of counsel to appeal habeas petition, in violation of State law (K.S.A. 22-4506(c) and Kansas Supreme Court Rul@:183(m), constitute a State created impediment under 2244(d)(1)(B)? 6) Was petitioner's "Notice of Appeal" a properly filed application to toll limitation period under 2244(d)(2)? 7) Does a district court dismissing a State prisoner's original 2254 as untimely prevent him from challenging timeli=> ness in a subsequent petition? 8) Did petitioner abandon the claims that the district court hold were meritless, focusing instead on claims that the court held were procedurally defaulted? 9) Did the district court err in assessing procedural de#aul fault, and did the petitioner excuse a procedural default? ‘