whether-the-judiciary-must-reverse-and-allow-trial-of-bounty-clause-contract

QUESTIONS PRESENTED : I. Whether the judiciary, via the United States Court of Federal Claims or the United States . Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, must de novo reverse and allow for a trial of a , sufficiently alleged Bounty Clause contract under the dictate of Section 4 of the Fourteenth : Amendment (1868) which is also governed through the Big Tucker Act (1887), 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a). Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 290 (1884) (state officials are not the same as governmental officials; “the distinction between [them]...is important, and should be observed;” and state officials may make “promises” independent of the Big Tucker Act). Contra. Patel v. United States, No. 22-2251 (Fed. Cir. 2022), ECF 31. Il. | Whether the United States Court of Federal Claims or the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit abused its discretion by not providing Petitioner Patel sreasonable ; opportunity” to “adduce supportive facts” through discovery, including under. the Presidential Records Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2202, which regulates material communications from Petitioner to the President of the United States since at least 2006, or tial, sufficient for this court-to reverse. Crist_v. Republic of Turkey, 995 F. Supp. 5, 12 MDC. 1998) and Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 US. 91, 115 n. 31 0979) cited in Tinton Falls Lodging Realty, LLC v. United States, 800 F.3d 1353, 1364 (F ed. Cir. 2015). Ill. | Whether the United States Court of Federal Claims or the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit clearly errored in finding parole and abused its discretion by not holding that petitioner’s religious “look” has been unduly burdened by the ‘breach of contract which was purposefully crafted and expressed as a mandatory and spud term by the petitioner to prevent burden on his religious free exercise or Ordered Liberty for this the reasonably risky term and accepted by respondent. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seg. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 575 U.S. 768, 770-71, 781-82 (2015). IV. Whether the judiciary should prioritize relief of this matter because it relates to the enjoyment of property and Ordered Liberties under sections 1981-1982.of Title 42 of the United States Code. ; V. Whether the interference on the contract itself is an illegal exaction sections 1981-1982 of Title 42 of the United States Code. Taylor v. United States, 959 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2020). See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Hazelhurst Oil Mill Fertilizer Co. v. United States, 42 F.2d 331, 340 (Fed. Cir. 1930) (want of “equal terms” include choice of monetary compensation, i.e. money or stamps, and political power). . VI. Whether the United States Court of Federal Claims or the United States Court of Appeals ‘ for the Federal Circuit abused its discretion when not allowing the complaint on the RCFC 8(a)(1) affirmative defense to compel accord and satisfaction. First Nat’] City Bank v. United States, 537 F.2d 426, 440 (Fed. Cir. 1976). District of Columbia v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 292 (2005). Cf. Hazelhurst Oil Mill, 42. F.2d at 340. : VII. Whether the United States Court of Federal Claims or the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit abused its discretion or clearly errored by not transferring the venue to the President of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2). ; : VII. Whether Petitioner Raj K. Patel ““‘abuse[d]’ the [law]” by coming before the United States : judiciary. H. J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989) (internal citations : _ omitted). ii