Did the Fifth Circuit err when it 're-branded' a failure to prove an essential element of the government's methamphetamine case against Mr. Jones beyond a reasonable doubt to be no more than a 'sentencing' issue to be resolved by the District Court based on a preponderance of the evidence burden of proof?

QUESTION PRESENTED In addressing Roy Lee Jones, Jr.’s claim that the evidence in this methampethamine prosecution supported only a conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals erred. Specifically the Fifth Circuit wrongly found that “[t]he relevant statute prohibits trafficking in any ‘controlled substance.’ 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The specific kind of controlled substance is ‘not a formal element of the conspiracy offense.’ See United States v. Daniels, 723 F.3d 562, 573 (5th Cir. 2013). Therefore, the defendants cannot challenge their convictions on these grounds, but merely their sentences. Id.” In United States v. Aguirre-Rivera, 8 F.4th 405, 410 (5th Cir. 2021), Mr. Baltazar Aguirre-Rivera argued that “[t]he amount of drugs involved in a conspiracy affects the statutory range of punishment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). So, the drug quantity must ‘necessarily form|[] a constituent part’ of the offense with which Aguirre-Rivera was charged—conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 114. If the government failed to prove the amount of heroin involved, then it failed to prove an essential element of the offense as charged.” (all but first alteration in original)’ In Aguirre-Rivera, the Fifth Cicruit recogized that, “[a]lthough this argument has some intuitive force, we are bound by our post-Alleyne precedent holding ' Quoting Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013). otherwise in this context.” 8 F.4th at 410. This Court is not bound by such precedent, which now potentially allows the Government to “convict” a defendant of a drug offense involving a different controlled substance than charged in the indictment or than presented to the jury. That is, under the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, the Government’s failure to prove a charged element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt has been relegated to a “sentencing” issue weighed by a trial court applying a preponderance of the evidence burden of proof. Did the Fifth Circuit err when it “re-branded” a failure to prove an essential element of the Government’s methaphetamine case against Mr. Jones beyond a reasonable doubt to be no more than a “sentencing” issue to be resolved by the District Court based on a preponderance of the evidence burden of proof? -ii