Should a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent other than racial bias be actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Should a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent other than racial bias be actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the possibility of which was left open in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), given 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) makes no reference to race? Should the invidious discriminatory intent of the conspirators be considered more vigorously, and the classbased aspect of the conspirators’ animus be deemphasized, when analyzing 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) claims? Should a specific intent requirement replace the classbased animus requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)? Should all federal courts be compelled to extend 42 US.C. § 1985(3) protections to disabled individuals, thereby, resolving the inconsistency, confusion, and incongruity lingering in the class-based aspect of the conspirators’ animus giving full effect to the Congressional purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) in line with 42 USC. § 12101ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA)? Does the U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 authorize Congress to reach purely private conduct? Since Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) should the constitutional basis of Congressional power to enact 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and to use it to reach private conspiracies be based on the U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5? | EME Tr pas a 4 oy sey 1 ii QUESTIONS PRESENTED -— Continued Should all federal courts hobble 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) with the U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5’s state action requirement, given this Court refused to do so in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) and 42 US.C. § 1985(3) expressly addresses persons not states?