Whether the Eleventh Circuit's analysis of ineffective assistance of counsel claims fails to protect the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process announced in Strickland v. Washington

QUESTIONS PRESENTED This Court has interpreted the prejudice standard of Strickland v. Washington to require that postconviction courts engage with, and do not discount unreasonably, mitigating evidence which was available at trial but not presented to the jury or sentencing court. However, courts continue to discount mitigating evidence presented in postconviction by declaring that it would undercut mitigation presented at trial. Even where the mitigation presented at trial was afforded minimal weight, postconviction courts continue to treat as non-mitigating the types of evidence this Court has consistently deemed to be mitigating, because the newly presented mitigation might be a “double-edged sword.” The Petitioner here presents the question: Whether the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of ineffective assistance of counsel claims fails to protect the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process announced in Strickland v. Washington, when it denies relief based on the assertion that substantial postconviction mitigation would have undercut the minimal mitigation presented at trial, which the sentencing court deemed to be of minimal weight? i