Is it contrary to the clearly established Strickland standard to assess the prejudice from trial counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel for her failure to investigate and deploy the strongest defense to the most serious charged count measured by only examining whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Under clearly established law, in most ineffective assistance of trial counsel cases, prejudice is shown by demonstrating “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). Based on this framework, the Supreme Court has held that a state court decision would be “contrary” to Strickland if it required a prisoner to meet a higher evidentiary burden than “reasonable probability.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). To ensure state courts have “a meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of legal error without interference from the federal judiciary,” a habeas petitioner must “fairly present[]” his claims to the state court. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257 (1986). 1. Is it contrary to the clearly established Strickland standard to assess the prejudice from trial counsel’s ineffective assistance of counsel for her failure to investigate and deploy the strongest defense to the most serious charged count measured by only examining whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict? 2. Does the “fairly presented” exhaustion standard limit a petitioner to claims that were “centered” in a “clear fram[ing]” or can the necessary facts and legal bases set out in the state post-conviction relief petition and in briefing to the state appellate courts be considered in federal court? i