Is it ineffective assistance of counsel for a court-appointed attorney to enter into a joint defense agreement without client consent, waiving 4th Amendment rights?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Is it ineffective assistance of counsel (guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution) for a client’s court-appointed attorney, without the client’s consent, to enter into a joint defense agreement with the paid attomneys of a client’s co-defendant thereby unilaterally waiving the client’s Fourth Amendment rights; and under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), or can those actions be classified as effective trial strategy? 2. When a District Attorney knowingly makes material misrepresentations to a trial court resulting in an adverse ruling substantially affecting a defendant, do those actions constitute structural ineffectiveness of counsel? . 3. Did the Georgia courts improperly apply this Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), in not setting aside Coggins’ conviction based upon the State’s failure to reveal the tacit or implied agreement with Timothy Wayne Osborne, a jailhouse informant who testified about an alleged “jailhouse confession”, thereby resulting in a denial of Coggins’ 14 Amendment due process rights? 4. Was Coggins afforded effective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel; and, did the Superior Court of Dodge County err in holding Coggins’ legal representation was based upon trial strategy, was not prejudicial, and was not in ‘ i violation of Coggins’ 6'" Amendment right to have effective representation at his criminal trial and in his appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia? 5. Did Appellate Counsel Peter Johnson provide ineffective assistance of appellate counsel by not raising ineffective assistance of Trial Counsel David Weber as requested by Coggins; in not raising the Brady-Giglio issue; in advising Johnson’s former client, Timothy Osborne, of the penalty for perjury following Osborne’s admission to giving perjured testimony in Coggins’ case; and in not withdrawing from representing Coggins in Coggins’ Motion for New Trial in order to become a witness for Coggins in order to impeach Osborne? 6. Do the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42 giving the State of Georgia the right to appeal the grant of a petition for habeas relief, but requiring that a Petitioner file an Application for Appeal, result in a denial of one’s 14'* Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights, which in this case resulted in an additional forty ( 40) month delay in the resolution of the habeas appeal and, when added to the other delays in the handling of the motion for new trial and appeal, have resulted in a total time from conviction to denial of the Application for Appeal of 203 months that were raised in the motion before the Georgia Supreme Court and denied on February 7, 2023? 3 ii